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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Layne Curtis Martin asserts that the district court erred when it denied his
requests to suppress the evidence found as a result of the officers’ warrantless search of his
vehicle, and warrantless seizure of the items inside. The plain view doctrine and the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to justify the officers’ actions.
The State, in its Respondent’s Brief, argues that Mr. Martin has not shown that the
district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because the search of the vehicle and
seizure of the alleged dabs kit were valid under the plain view and automobile exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-25.) This Reply Brief is necessary to address certain
of the State’s arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Martin articulated the relevant facts and proceedings in the Appellant’s Brief. They
are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.
As a point of information, the State writes in its statement of the facts that, well into the
search of the vehicle, “Officer Macuk picked up and examined what appears to be a medical
bracelet that was sitting in the dabs kit. (Ex. A, 33:00-33:10; see also State’s Ex. 6.).” (Resp.
Br., p.8.) The State then writes, “Officer Moyle said: ‘Guy he said he took to the hospital,’
presumably referring to [Mr.] Martin’s earlier comment that he had taken a friend named Caleb
Birch to the hospital that day. (Ex. A, ~33:09, 24:20.)” (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)
However, Mr. Martin actually stated in that earlier comment, “I was talking to my
roommate, ’kay? About my buddy that he just brought to the hospital, which is Caleb Bircher,
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’kay? The dude that you asked about. My buddy, my roommate, Robert Anderson, brought
Caleb to the hospital just now.” (Ex. A, 24:19-24:30.)

2

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Martin’s requests to suppress the evidence found as
a result of the officers’ warrantless seizure of the items inside his vehicle and warrantless search
of his vehicle, because the plain view doctrine and the automobile exception did not apply?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Martin’s Requests To Suppress The Evidence
Found As A Result Of The Officers’ Warrantless Seizure And Search, Because The Plain View
Doctrine And The Automobile Exception Did Not Apply

A.

Introduction
Mr. Martin asserts the district court erred when it denied his requests to suppress the

evidence found as a result of the officers’ warrantless seizure of the items observed inside his
vehicle and warrantless search of his vehicle, because the plain view doctrine and the automobile
exception did not apply. Thus, the district court should have granted Mr. Martin’s motion to
suppress and his motion for reconsideration.

B.

The Plain View Doctrine Did Not Apply To Justify The Officers’ Warrantless Seizure Of
The Items They Observed In The Backseat Of Mr. Martin’s Vehicle, Because It Was Not
Immediately Apparent To The Officers That The Items Were Evidence Of A Crime
The plain view doctrine did not apply to justify the officers’ warrantless seizure of the

items they observed in the backseat of Mr. Martin’s vehicle, because the officers did not have
probable cause to believe the items were associated with criminal activity, and therefore it was
not immediately apparent to the officers that the items were evidence of a crime. See Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2008).
The State argues that the nature of the items as drug paraphernalia was immediately
apparent to the officers, based on the officers’ testimony that they knew from their training and
experience that the items were used to smoke or inhale marijuana. (See Resp. Br., p.21.) The
State contends, “just as in [State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319 (Ct. App. 1991)], that evidence is
sufficient to demonstrate that Officer Moyle had probable cause to believe the items were drug
paraphernalia.” (Resp. Br., p.22.) However, this case is distinguishable from Ramirez.
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In Ramirez, an officer saw a spoon, with what appeared to be a dark, tarry residue in its
bowl, inside a car that the defendant had occupied. See Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 321. The officer
“opened the vehicle door and took the spoon, believing it had been used to prepare heroin.” Id.
After the State charged the defendant with felony possession of a controlled substance, the
defendant filed a motion to suppress the spoon as evidence, which the district court denied. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the officer’s conduct in approaching and looking
inside the vehicle did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 322.
Turning to the officer’s intrusion into the vehicle and seizure of the spoon, the Ramirez
Court held they were constitutionally permissible. See id. at 322-23. The Court determined
whether the officer reasonably could have concluded that the item he saw inside the vehicle was
contraband or evidence of a crime, based on the following facts:
The record shows that [the officer] first observed the cigarette lighter lying on the
floorboard of the passenger’s side of the vehicle. He then saw the spoon, lying
face up on the driver’s seat. In the bowl of the spoon was a black, tarry substance
resembling heroin. [The officer] inferred that the lighter was used to heat the
heroin in the spoon. We also note that [the officer] observed these items while in
the parking lot of a place of reported drug activity. [The officer] further testified
that he knew what the item was “from experience.”
Id. at 323.
The defendant in Ramirez asserted that the State “failed to sufficiently detail the level of
experience drawn upon by [the officer] in associating the spoon and residue with drug use,” and
without evidence of that background, the district court “could not determine whether the officer’s
conclusions were reasonable.” Id. The Ramirez Court disagreed, holding, “Although the record
of the officer’s experience is brief, it does establish that [the officer] had made a previous arrest
for possession of heroin and also that he knew what the substance looked like.” Id. The Court
further held, “The record also shows he was aware of the practice, common among heroin users,
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of melting the substance in an ordinary spoon prior to injection.” Id. The Ramirez Court
concluded, “this showing demonstrates a level of experience adequate to support the officer’s
reasonable belief that the spoon he observed was drug paraphernalia.” Id.
This case is distinguishable from Ramirez, because the officers here did not show a level
of experience adequate to support a reasonable belief that the items seen in Mr. Martin’s car
were evidence of a crime. First, the officers’ statements during the search indicate they did not
recognize the observed items as evidence of a crime until after they seized the items. (See Ex. A,
33:00-33:25.)1 For instance, when Officer Moyle picked up the package containing the alleged
dabs kit, he asked, “What is all this stuff? What is this?” (Ex. A, 33:00-33:07.)
Second, while the officer in Ramirez knew of the practice of melting heroin in a spoon
before injection, Officer Moyle did not know how the small metal piece found among the items
here was used, and he testified that he had not personally seen anybody use the crescent moonshaped piece of glass. (See 1/8/20 Tr., p.58, Ls.22-25, p.59, L.14 – p.60, L.7.) He could not
name the items in the alleged dabs kit, and he did not know how to use most of the items. (See
1/8/20 Tr., p.58, L.15 – p.60, L.7.) Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, Officer Moyle did not
explain “how such kits are used to smoke marijuana.” (See Resp. Br., p.22.) Officer Macuk also
testified that he did not know how the glass shapes among the items were used. (See 1/8/20
Tr., p.26, L.21 – p.27, L.1.)

1

Mr. Martin disputes the State’s contention that one of those statements, Officer Moyle’s
statement, “It’s new,” is difficult to hear. (See Resp. Br., p.9 n.3.) The State argues that “the
statement could also be ‘his name,’ which would be consistent with the officers’ discussion of
the medical bracelet and may refer to Caleb Birch, whom [Mr.] Martin mentioned taking to the
hospital.” (Resp. Br., p.9 n.3.) The video recording shows that Mr. Martin actually mentioned
that his roommate took Caleb Bircher to the hospital. (See Ex. A, 24:19-24:30.) Mr. Martin
submits that Officer Moyle stated, while looking at the green and yellow silicone container
among the items, “It’s new. It’s enough for us.” (Ex. A, 33:15-33:22; see R., p.228.)
6

Thus, unlike the officer in Ramirez, the officers here did not show a level of experience
adequate to support a reasonable belief that the items seen in Mr. Martin’s car were evidence of a
crime. See Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 323. This case would be more comparable with Ramirez if the
officer in Ramirez had been unable to name the spoon or explain how it was used to prepare
heroin for injection.
The State also contends that “the video corroborates the officers’ testimony that they
recognized the items as drug paraphernalia prior to searching the vehicle,” because Officer
Moyle “began his contact with [Mr.] Martin by confronting [Mr.] Martin about those items—‘the
dabs’ and ‘[t]he little circular container and the glass bowl’ in [Mr.] Martin’s vehicle.” (Resp.
Br., p.22 (quoting Ex. A, 00:30-00:45).) The State argues, “Officer Moyle continued to refer to
the items as a dabs kit and drug paraphernalia throughout his interaction with [Mr.] Martin prior
to searching the vehicle or seizing the items.” (Resp. Br., pp.22-23 (citing Ex. A., ~00:45, 01:22,
01:34, 03:39).) But as seen above, when Officer Moyle picked up the package containing the
alleged dabs kit, over thirty minutes into the encounter, he asked, “What is all this stuff? What is
this?”

(Ex. A, 33:00-33:07.)

Officer Moyle’s question indicates that, despite his earlier

statements, he did not recognize the observed items as evidence of a crime until after the officers
seized the items.
The State argues that at the time Officer Moyle made that statement, “The video shows
Officer Macuk pick up and examine what appears to be a medical bracelet that was sitting in the
dabs kit; he does not appear to pick up or examine any other items from the dabs kit.” (Resp.
Br., p.23 (citing Ex. A, 33:00-33:10; State’s Ex. 6).) However, there was no testimony from the
officers or any other evidence that the item Officer Macuk picked up was a medical bracelet.
(See generally 1/8/20 Tr.) Additionally, as opposed to the State’s characterization of the facts,
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Mr. Martin actually commented that his roommate took Caleb Bircher to the hospital. (See Ex.
A, 24:19-24:30.) Thus, rather than depict the officers examining a medical bracelet, the video
recording shows Officer Moyle looking at the green and yellow silicone container among the
items, and stating, “It’s new. It’s enough for us.” (Ex. A, 33:15-33:22; see R., p.228.)
As shown by the video recording of the encounter, the officers’ statements during the
search indicate they did not recognize what the items were before seizing them, much less
believe they were evidence of a crime. Additionally, the officers’ testimony to the contrary was
not credible. Under these circumstances, the facts available to the officers would not warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the items they observed in the vehicle were evidence
of a crime. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. Thus, the officers did not have probable cause
to believe that the items were associated with criminal activity. See id.; Baldwin, 145 Idaho at
155-56. It was therefore not immediately apparent to the officers that the items may be evidence
of crime. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 155. Application of the plain view doctrine does not justify
the officers’ warrantless seizure of the items. See id.

C.

The Automobile Exception Did Not Apply To Justify The Warrantless Search Of
Mr. Martin’s Vehicle, Because The Officers Did Not Have Probable Cause To Believe
That The Vehicle Contained Contraband Or Evidence Of A Crime
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement does not justify the officers’

warrantless search of Mr. Martin’s vehicle, because the officers did not have probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. See State v. Buti, 131
Idaho 793, 800 (1998).
The State argues that, because the officers immediately recognized the items to be drug
paraphernalia and they therefore had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband
or evidence of a crime, the warrantless search of the vehicle was permissible under the
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automobile exception. (See, e.g., Resp. Br., p.25.) Contrary to the State’s argument, for the
reasons discussed above and in the Appellant’s Brief (see App. Br., pp.25-26), and incorporated
herein, the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Martin’s vehicle contained
contraband or evidence of a crime.
Despite the State’s arguments, the plain view doctrine does not justify the officers’
warrantless seizure of the items inside Mr. Martin’s SUV, and the automobile exception does not
justify their warrantless search of the vehicle. Thus, the State has not met its burden of showing
that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable here. See Halen v. State,
136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). The district court erred when it denied Mr. Martin’s requests to
suppress the evidence found as a result of the officers’ warrantless seizure of the items observed
inside his vehicle, and the warrantless search of his vehicle. The evidence found as a result of
the illegal seizure and search should be suppressed, either as evidence obtained directly from the
illegal government actions, or as fruit of the poisonous tree in the case of the evidence found in
the later search of the hotel room. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009).

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Martin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and the order denying his motion for
reconsideration.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2021.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of August, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BPM/eas
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